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Comments
Private Action Under The Public
Trust: An Environmental Bill
Of Rights For California
Today when rhetoric abounds from almost every available forum
espousing condemnation of the elusive actor credited with deteriora-
tion of man's environment, the populace still moves lethargically
toward a state of alarm. Each person looks toward his neighbor,
beckoning him to take up the quixotic challenge to save our world
from our hypocritical self. Yet, as this comment points out, even
those pilgrims so naive they accept the Don's armor and sword
abruptly discover their plan of attack (legal action based on a
private remedy) is inadequate for their purpose and they are fore-
closed from taking the battlefield to confront the "windmill" pol-
luter.. The writer suggests the solution to the dilemma of foreclosure
of individual action might be derived from the concept of the
"public trust" discussed in detail below. A review and analysis
of the Michigan Environment Protection Act of 1970, the first
legislative enactment of the public trust theory for environmental
protection, provides some insight concerning the practicability of
this theory, and how it might be applied by individuals as a basis
for a private action to protect California's environment.
As we have become more populated and more technologically so-
phisticated we realize that nature cannot repair all of its man-
caused wounds by itself. As man demands more, he must give
more.'
While the preservation of environmental quality has become a prob-
lem of nationwide concern, most of the development of environmental
law has taken place outside the courtroom. The slow development of
1. Statement by former Chief Deputy Attorney General Charles A. O'Brien
before California State Assembly Committee on Water, Sacramento, California, Mon-
day, April 7, 1969.
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case law in this area has been attributed to procedural difficulties such as
a failure of the courts to grant private groups either standing to sue or
the right to initiate a class action; problems of evidence; historic limita-
tions on the concept of tort liability; as well as a feeling by the judi-
ciary that legislative policy must precede specific case decisions.2 Spe-
cifically, many modem pollutants such as photo-chemical smog have had
gradual unforseen effects upon man and environment--effects which,
while threatening man's existence, have not often fit within traditional
tort concepts and have subsequently escaped private litigation.3 Cou-
pled with the additional fact that both federal and state pollution con-
trol agencies have not been completely successful,4 the private citizen
appears to be without an effective means of protecting his environment
either in the courts or by following administrative procedures.
In view of the inadequacy of traditional bases of private action in
dealing with pollution problems and in recognition of the valuable safe-
guard to effective agency control private litigation can provide, 5 it is
the purpose of this comment to propose that California enact legisla-
tion granting individual citizens an effective environmental cause of ac-
tion. As will be shown, such legislation is not without at least con-
ceptual support in public trust laws and decisions; nor is such legisla-
tion without precedent in other states. Michigan has recently granted
private citizens standing to bring suits against environmental waste with-
out the necessity of proving special injury.6
The following discussion will first demonstrate the need for such legis-
lation by briefly reviewing the inadequacies of the existing private rem-
edies available against polluters; secondly, discuss the public trust con-
cept as the conceptual basis for such legislation and finally examine the
strengths and weaknesses of the Michigan Act in terms of its effect on
the private pollution suit and as supplying guidelines for similar legis-
lation in California.
PRESENT ROLE OF PRIVATE LITIGATION IN POLLUTION CONTROL
As indicated previously the most fundamental problem for the en-
vironmental lawyer is finding a substantive theory upon which to base
2. Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress,
68 MicH. L. REv. 1073, 1075-76 (1970).
3. CONTINnG EDUCATION OF THE BAR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK § 6.19
(1970).
4. Comment, Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?
68 Mica. L. REv. 1254, 1259-60 (1970).
5. Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLuM. L. REv. 734, 755(1970).
6. Environmental Protection Act of 1970, Public Act No. 127, M.C.L.A.§§ 691.1201-691.1207 (1970).
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litigation. In California, and most other states for that matter, private
citizens seeking redress against polluters are limited to actions based on
traditional tort theories.7 Perhaps the most commonly used cause of
action in the area of pollution is that of nuisance. Air pollution was
labeled a nuisance as early as 1611.8 In California nuisance is de-
fined as
anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to in-
terfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property. ..
To recover under nuisance plaintiff must prove that there is or will be
a substantial interference, that defendant's conduct is unreasonable and
that such conduct is the proximate cause of such interference. 10 If the
nuisance causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise
of its common rights it is a public nuisance."' For the private person
to recover under public nuisance he must prove special damages, i.e.,
damages other than those sustained as a member of the general public. 12
This requirement of showing special damages has for the most part ren-
dered nuisance actions ineffective against the major polluting activities
of community-wide proportion, wherein damage to the individual apart
from that shared by the general public is difficult to show.13 Addition-
ally, an action for nuisance is subject to several defenses: the action
will not lie if defendant has acquired a prescriptive right;14 nor if the
plaintiff can be said to have voluntarily chosen his place to live, i.e.,
7. With the exception of Michigan (see text accompanying note 6 supra), no
state has granted its citizens standing to directly enjoin alleged polluting activities.
The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act of 1969 (CAL. WATER CODE § 13000
et seq.) allows "aggrieved persons" to appeal discharge requirements to the State
Board or the courts if necessary (§§ 13320, 13330), however all civil actions to enforce
the provisions of the act are brought by the Attorney General (§ 13361). Addition-
ally, the California Legislature has removed the requirement that plaintiff show a
lack of adequate remedy at law and irreparable damage in civil actions brought to
enjoin violations of Air Pollution Control Board standards (A.B. 90, CAL. STATS.
1970, c.73, p. 86). Yet this amendment applies only to actions brought in the name of
the people by the pollution control districts.
Currently pending before the California legislature are two measures, A.B. 838
(Hayes) introduced on March 8, 1971, and A.B. 985 (Z'berg) introduced on March 16,
1971, which are intended to greatly increase the effectiveness of private pollution suits.
A.B. 985 contains provisions identical to those contained in the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act, while A.B. 838 would limit private actions to situations not involving
conduct expressly authorized by (a) state statute, (b) state agency rule, regulation or
order, or (c) a public entity.
8. William Alfred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479.
10. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS, Nuisance, § 88 (3d ed. 1964).
11. Id. § 89.
12. Id.
13. See Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Pri-
vate Rights, 1967 DuKE L.J. 1126, 1135 (1967); the same appears to be true in private
actions against water pollution, see Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regula-
tion of Water Quality, 52 IowA L. REv. 186, 197-198 (1966).
14. Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Company, 161 Cal. 239, 244 (1911).
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"came to the nuisance",15 nor if defendant's action is authorized by
statute.16
By far the most common goal of private pollution suits is injunctive
relief.' 7 Since damages are often uncertain or difficult to show to a cer-
tainty and there is frequently a possibility of a multiplicity of actions,
an injunction is not likely to be denied on the grounds of the existence
of an adequate remedy at law. Yet, gaining an injunction against pol-
luters is by no means an easy matter as the decision requires the court
to "balance the equities.""' This generally means that the court will
weigh the gravity of harm to the plaintiff against the social utility of de-
fendant's conduct and the feasibility and cost of remedying the com-
plained of nuisance. In Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co.,"
the court rejected the balancing test and granted injunctive relief, how-
ever this case has not been consistently followed. 20  The balancing doc-
trine is particularly important in the area of pollution because the ulti-
mate resolution depends upon what factors and policy decisions the
judge wishes to "put on the scale".21 Generally "balancing the equities"
has meant balancing the equities of the complainants and even courts
who employ the concept of the "greatest good to the greatest number of
people", have failed to consider the possible harm from pollution to
thousands or even millions of people not party to the action; in a real
sense then there is not a true balancing of the equities.22 Additionally
in California, the plaintiff must contend with Code of Civil Procedure
section 731a which prohibits private citizens from enjoining an activity
which is reasonable and necessary to the express zoning use to which
property is devoted.
15. East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Ore. 505, 246 P.2d 554
(1952); Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 15 Wash. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
However, Prosser suggests that a more accurate statement would be that "coming to the
nuisance" is merely one factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of
the use rather than a total bar to the bringing of the action. PROSSER, supra note 10,
§ 92. See also Juergensmeyer, supra note 13, at 1136.
16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482 provides "nothing which is done or maintained under
the express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance."
17. See Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 CoLIrm. L. Rnv. 734,
747 (1970).
18. See Peterson v. Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387 (1897); Williams v. Los Angeles
Railroad, 150 Cal. 592 (1907); Parker v. P. G. & E. Co., 50 Cal. App. 264 (1920);
Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368 (1942); Christensen v. Tucker, 114 Cal. App. 2d 554(1952); Oertel v. Copley, 152 Cal. App. 2d 287 (1957); Family Record Plan Inc. v.
Mitchell, 172 Cal. App. 2d 235 (1959); Frabotta v. Alencastre, 182 Cal. App. 2d 679
(1960); Scheble v. Nell, 200 Cal. App. 2d 435 (1962).
19. 161 Cal. 239 (1911).
20. See cases cited supra note 18.
21. Juergensmeyer, supra note 13, at 1134.
22. Juergensmeyer, supra note 13, at 1134.
23. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 731a provides:
Whenever any city, city and county, or county shall have established zones or
districts under authority of law wherein certain manufacturing or commercial
or airport uses are expressly permitted, except in an action to abate a public
nuisance brought in the name of the people of the State of California, no
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The private citizen who cannot satisfy the above-mentioned requisites
for a successful nuisance action in many instances might find a suitable
alternative in an action for trespass. Mere wrongful entry upon the
land is sufficient to maintain an action for trespass24 and this is often
easier to show than a substantial interference which is required for nui-
sance. A trespass theory has been successfully used in an action to re-
cover for damage caused by escaping pollutants from an aluminum
plant.25  However, some courts have denied recovery either by holding
that air pollutants are not substantial enough to constitute physical en-
try or that entry was not direct since wind had intervened to carry pol-
lutants onto the plaintiff's land.26
A third possible basis for private action against pollution is provided
by an action for damages based on negligence. Negligence actions in
this field have been often hampered by the difficulty in establishing a
causal relationship between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury.27
In Hagy v. Allied Chem Dye Corp.,28 plaintiff successfully sued for
damage to her larynx when she drove through smog allegedly contain-
ing sulphuric acid compounds negligently emitted from defendant's
plant.29 The value of Hagy as a precedent seems to be lessened by the
fact that defendant apparently admitted negligence.30 Unlike Hagy, in
most cases negligence is not admitted, which raises the additional prob-
lem of determining the standard of care to use for polluters. Has
the polluter met the standard of care required if he shows that he
puts out fewer pollutants than any other operation of his type or that he
uses all available control devices? Or that the cost of additional con-
trol devices would be substantial? In the final analysis the standard to
which the courts will hold the producer of pollutants depends upon the
judge's or jury's view of the social utility of pollution control. 3 1
person or persons, firm or corporation shall be enjoined or restrained by the
injunctive process from the reasonable and necessary operation in any such
industrial or commercial zone or airport of any use expressly permitted therein,
nor shall such use be deemed a nuisance without evidence of the employment
of unnecessary and injurious methods of operation.
For discussion of the effect of § 731a see Steinberg, Rights Under California Law of
the Individual Injured by Air Pollution, 27 So. CAL. L. REv. 405 (1954).
24. Triscony v. Brandenstein, 66 Cal. 514 (1885); Macleod v. Fox West Coast
Theatres Corp., 10 Cal. 2d 383 (1937). See PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, Intentional
Interference with Property, § 13 (3d ed. 1964).
25. Martin v. Reynolds Metal Company, 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
26. See Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 P. 813
(1924) (industrial dust); Arvidson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.
Wash. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957) (noxious fumes).
27. Juergensmeyer, supra note 13, at 1143.
28. 122 Cal. App. 2d 361 (1953).
29. Id. at 363.
30. "Appellants do not contend that there is insufficient evidence of negligence
in the operation of their plant." Id. at 364.
31. For an example of a commendable approach to the problem see Renken v.
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The doctrine of strict liability without fault may apply to polluters if
the defendant's conduct can be considered ultra-hazardous,12 or within
the limits of absolute nuisance. 3 Such theories have been used only in-
frequently in pollution control.34 The doctrine of products liability un-
der which a seller of a product is strictly liable for injuries caused by
dangerous defects in design or manufacture has been mentioned in con-
nection with air pollution suits, but its applicability is questionable.8 5
If plaintiff's property has been damaged by pollutants from governmen-
tal activities or by private companies having the power of eminent do-
main,3" he may be able to bring an action for inverse condemnation. 7
Another potential basis for action against pollution which is available
in federal courts should be mentioned here. A number of private
groups have filed actions under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act against the
major automobile manufacturers alleging that .they have agreed to de-
lay research development, manufacture and installation of motor vehicle
pollution control equipment."8 These cases are now pending in the Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California.
As the foregoing illustrates, pollution problems are not readily amen-
able to actions by individual citizens within the existing theories of pri-
vate action. Generally, the obstacles facing the private litigant can be
summarized thusly: If the plaintiff suffers no direct personal or eco-
nomic harm from the alleged polluting activity he lacks standing to
sue;89 those seeking environmental quality are almost invariably the
plaintiffs and hence must prove the basic issues; for this reason it has
been said that even if the law favors environmental quality, present pro-
cedure favors polluters.40 In the equitable determination of whether an
Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963), in which the court stated
at 172:
While we are not dealing with the public as such, we must recognize that air
pollution is one of the great problems now facing the American public. If
necessary the cost of installing adequate controls must be passed on to the
ultimate consumer. The heavy cost of corrective devices is no reason why
the plaintiffs should stand by and suffer substantial damage.
32. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328 (1928); Luthringer v.
Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489 (1948).
33. See PROssER, LAW OF TORTS, Strict Liability § 77 (3d ed., 1964).
34. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 13, at 1151.
35. See ENvrONmENTAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at § 6.25; Katz, The
Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CrN. L. REv. 587, 623
(1969).
36. CAL. Crw. CODE § 1001.
37. See Tyler v. Tehama County, 109 Cal. 618 (1895); Hillside Water Co. v.
Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677 (1938).
38. In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 311 F. Supp. 1349(1970).
39. See Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAv.
L Rav. 1265 (1961); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Reiview: Private Actions, 75
HARv. L. Rnv. 255 (1962).
40. Krier, Environment, Litigation and the Burden of Proof (unpublished work
cited in ENviRoNmENTAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at § 4.22). For a discussion
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injunction will issue, success for the individual depends on how much
importance those interpreting the law place on pollution control.41 The
most important consequence of these obstacles restricting environmen-
tal litigation is that even when successful, existing litigation is neces-
sarily limited to only a small part of the entire pollution problem. Pri-
vate action is only feasible where there is a single point source of pol-
lution, i.e., an identifiable polluter. When pollution reaches com-
munity-wide proportions, where many pollutants have commingled,
private action is rarely appropriate due to the difficulty in establishing
causation or in identifying the tortfeasor.42
THE PUBLIC TRUST CONCEPT: THE RIGHT
TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT?
In its most simple form the public trust concept means that certain
resources are held by the state in trust for all the people and such re-
sources cannot or at least should not be dissipated. 43  The influence of
the public trust concept upon American law can be best understood by
briefly reviewing its early developments in Roman and English law.
The concept appears to have its earliest roots in the Roman and English
concepts concerning the nature of property rights in rivers, the sea and
the seashore." Certain interests such as navigation and fishing were
sought to be preserved for the benefit of the public; accordingly prop-
erty used for those purposes was distinguished from general public
property which the sovereign could routinely grant to private owners.
While it was understood that perpetual use in certain common proper-
ties (such as the seashore, highways and running water), was granted to
the public, it has never been clear whether the public had an enforce-
able right to prevent the infringement of those interests. 45 As concep-
tual support for the public trust doctrine in the United States, Joseph
Sax identifies three principles that have historically been part of Ameri-
can law: first, that certain interests are so intrinsically important to
every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society as
one of citizens rather than serfs. The historic public rights of fishing
and navigation reflect this feeling.46 Secondly, that certain interests are
of the problems of proving causation in water pollution litigation see Hines, supra
note 13, at 198.
41. Juergensmeyer, supra note 13, at 1154.
42. Miller & Borchers, Private Lawsuits and Air Pollution Control, 56 A.B.A.J.
465, 466 (1970). See also CoNTIuuING EDUCAiION OF THE BAR, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW HADBOOK § 6.19 (1970).
43. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
44. Id. at 475.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 484.
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so particularly the gifts of nature's bounty that they ought to be re-
served for the whole of the populace. This principle led to the creation
of national parks and monuments.4 7 Finally, that certain uses have a
peculiarly public nature that makes their adaptation to private use inap-
propriate, i.e., the rule of water law that one does not own a property
right in water the same way he owns his watch or shoes, but that he owns
only a usufruct, an interest that incorporates the needs of others.48  It
is thus thought to be incumbent upon the government to regulate water
uses for the general benefit of the community and to take into account
the public nature which the physical nature of the resource implies. 9
The most celebrated public trust case in American law is the deci-
sion of the U. S. Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illi-
nois.50 In 1869 the Illinois Legislature made an extensive grant of sub-
merged lands, in fee, to the Illinois Railway. The grant included all
the land underlying Lake Michigan, for one mile out from the shore-
line and extending one mile in length along the central business district
of Chicago (more than one thousand acres, comprising virtually the
whole commercial waterfront of the city).51 In 1873 the legislature
repealed the 1869 grant5" and brought an action to invalidate the grant.
The Supreme Court upheld the state's claim and said that this convey-
ance of trust lands was beyond the power of the legislature. 58  The court
did not actually prohibit the disposition of trust lands to private par-
ties in all instances54 but rather said the
state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and the soils un-
der them. . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the adminis-
tration of government. .. 55
While the Illinois Central facts are highly unusual the case remains
an important precedent. Sax points out that the court articulated a
principle that has become the central substantive thought in public trust
litigation:
[w]hen a state holds a resource which is available for the free use
of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism
47. Id. at 484-485.
48. Id. at 485.
49. Id.
50. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
51. Id. at 405.
52. Id. at 410-411.
53. Id. at 453.
54. The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public
therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the pub-
lic interest in the lands and water remaining.
Id. at 453.
55. Id. at 453.
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upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallo-
cate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to
the self-interest of private parties."
Even though this thought has not met with uniform approval, the pub-
lic trust rationale is not without support in California. Early Cali-
fornia decisions either invalidated grants of tidelands to private parties
or read into such grants a trust obligation upon the private owner not to
change the waterfront or obstruct navigation." Later cases modified
the early principle and upheld grants of trust lands to private indi-
viduals, but found that such lands were impressed with the public trust
which required the owners to use their lands in a manner consistent
with the right of the public.58  As the court stated in People v. Cali-
fornia Fish Company,59 the grantee of such lands does not take abso-
lute ownership but rather takes "the title to the soil subject to the public
right of navigation."'0
In addition to case law, several California statutory enactments also
lend support to the public trust concept. Perhaps the most important
of these is the McAteer-Petris Act 1 which created the Bay Conservation
Development Commission to develop a plan for conservation of the wa-
ter of the bay and the development of its shoreline.0 2  Additionally in
the granting of tidelands to municipalities, California has indicated
that such lands should be "used for purposes in which there is a general
statewide interest."'
56. Sax, supra note 43, at 490.
57. Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471 (1871). See also Ward v. Mulford, 32
Cal. 365 (1867); Shirley v. Benicia, 118 Cal. 344 (1897); City of Oakland v. Oakland
Waterfront Co., 118 Cal. 160 (1897). These cases drew a distinction between grants
outside the scope of any legislative program and grants made as part of a public
program, such as the improvement of a harbor. The former were held invalid to the
extent they involved land subject to the public trust use, and valid to the extent they
covered worthless lands. But when the grant was part of a legislative program for
public purposes, historic or potential uses, it could be validly subordinated to such
public schemes. Sax, supra note 43, at 527-528.
58. See Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24 (1912). (Owner of tideland grant
cannot exclude public).
59. 166 Cal. 576 (1913).
60. Id. at 588.
61. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66600 et seq.; CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 1162, § 1, p. 2940.
62. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66603. The introductory language of the act clearly in-
dicates a recognition of the public interest therein:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that the public interest in the San
Francisco Bay is in its beneficial use for a variety of purposes; that the
public has an interest in the bay as the most valuable single natural resource
of an entire region, a resource that gives special character to the bay area;
that the bay is a single body of water than can be used for many purposes,
from conservation to planned development; and that the bay operates as a
delicate physical mechanism in which changes that affect one part of the
bay may also affect all other parts. It is therefore declared to be in the public
interest to create a politically responsible, democratic process by which the
San Francisco Bay and its shoreline can be analyzed, planned and regulated
as a unit.. . . CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66600.
63. CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1763, p. 3767 (grant of tidelands to City of Albany);
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While several cases evidence a rather expansive view as to what con-
stitute "public activities", 64 it appears that California has utilized the
public trust concept to constrain activities which significantly shift pub-
lie values into private uses or into uses which benefit a private group.65
The cases indicate that many courts have either consciously or un-
consciously employed public trust thinking in dealing with governmental
regulation of natural resources. Historically, the concept of the public
trust has been limited to situations involving tidelands, parks and high
and low water marks on seas and lakes. 66 However, the word "public
trust" has not been used with exacting precision, and, as with any ju-
dicially applied doctrine expanded on a case by case basis, its limits are
not easily determined. Important questions remain concerning not only
what are the resources encompassed by the public trust but also whether
the individual has enforceable rights thereunder. Sax has concluded
the public trust problems are found wherever governmental regulation
comes into question and that
the protections which the Courts have applied in conventional pub-
lic trust cases would be equally applicable and equally appropri-
ate in controversies involving air pollution, dissemination of pesti-
cides, location of rights-of-ways for utilities, for strip mining,
etc.67
Whether the public trust concept can be an effective means of combating
air pollution and the other problems as Sax suggests will primarily de-
pend upon the willingness of the courts to view the air we breathe as
belonging within the province of the public trust. It would at least ap-
pear that of all natural or so-called "public resources" the air is most
easily characterizable as "so particularly the gift of nature's bounty that
it ought to be reserved for the whole of the populace"68 and hence should
belong within the public trust. Even if the courts are willing to view
air quality as a public trust problem several additional questions must be
answered before this concept can supply an effective pollution remedy:
To what extent does the private citizen have enforceable rights under
the public trust? What are the government's duties and liabilities as
trustee of the public trust? If analogy to private trust litigation is ap-
propriate, answers to these questions can be supplied. In its basic form
CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 921, p. 2952 (grant of tidelands and submerged lands to Emery-
ville).64. See San Pedro, etc., Railroad v. Hamilton, 161 Cal. 610 (1911); Martin v.
Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 571 (1960).
65. See City of Coronado v. San Diego Unified Port District, 227 Cal. App. 2d
455 (1964); Higgins v. Santa Monica, 62 Cal. 2d 24 (1964).
66. See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra.
67. Sax, supra note 43, at 556-57.
68. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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a trust may be defined as a fiduciary relationship in which one person
holds a property interest subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use
that interest for the benefit of another. 9 Generally it is the duty of the
trustee of a private trust to prosecute or defend actions for the protection
of the trust.70 The beneficiary can bring an action against the trustee
for breach of the trustee's duty but normally he cannot bring an action
directly against a third party unless the trustee refuses to sue after de-
mand.71  A charitable trust can be defined as a "donation in trust for
promoting the welfare of mankind at large or a community or of some
class forming a part of it, indefinite as to numbers and individuals. "72
Supervision and enforcement of charitable trusts is done by the Attorney
General in behalf of the people of the state,73 and he is a necessary
party in actions to modify the trust provisions.7 4 Public trust operation
does not appear to fit neatly within the concept of either a private or a
charitable trust, but rather can be seen as containing elements of both.
A public trust is properly for the benefit of all the people and in this
sense it is akin to a charitable trust. Yet as each citizen is a beneficiary
of resources held in the public trust, each should have an enforceable
right against the trustee and third parties, when appropriate, as does
the beneficiary of a private trust. As trustee of the public trust, the gov-
ernment has the primary duty of protection and enforcement, and would
appear to always be a necessary party in litigation involving the trust.
Admittedly no court has expressly adopted such a comparison between
public and private trust litigation and, although individual rights in the
public trust remain largely undefined, a recent federal decision may shed
light on this area. In Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v.
Volpe 5 environmental organizations and several other groups sought
review of an Army Corps of Engineers decision to grant a permit for the
construction of an expressway on filled land in the Hudson River under
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1889.76 In holding that the plaintiffs
were proper parties to bring the action the court said,
the public interest in environmental resources . . . is a legally pro-
tected interest affording these plaintiffs, as responsible representa-
tives of the public, standing to obtain judicial review of agency ac-
tion alleged to be in contravention of that public interest.77
69. BOGERT, TRusTs, Introduction and History, § 1 (4th ed. 1963).
70. BOGERT, TRusrs, Duties of Trustee, § 98 (4th ed. 1963).
71. BOGERT, TRUSTS, Remedies of Beneficiary, § 166 (4th ed. 1963).
72. People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 138 (1896).
73. BOGERT, TRUSTS, Remedies of Beneficiary, § 156 (4th ed. 1963).
74. Id.
75. 425 F.2d 97 (1970).
76. Id. at 100.
77. Id. at 105.
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It appears that this case is an important step forward in clarifying the
scope of the individual's rights to bring actions in behalf of the public.
THE MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION ACT OF 1970
While public trust litigation appears to be gaining increasing ac-
ceptance in the courts, as Volpe would indicate, private rights un-
der the public trust can be most effectively protected by statute. Michi-
gan has become the first state to adopt such a measure in the form of
the 1970 Michigan Environmental Protection Act78 which provides the
private citizen with a judicial remedy for air pollution under the con-
cept of the public trust. The act provides that "any person, partnership,
corporation, association, organization or other legal entity" may main-
tain an action under this statute against "the state or any political sub-
division thereof, any person, partnership, corporation. . . or other le-
gal entity" for the "protection of the air, water and other natural re-
sources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or de-
struction. ' 79 This section expressly adopts the concept of the public
trust as well as recognizes the right of a citizen to bring an action for
breaches of that trust without the requirement of individual injury. The
Michigan Act is also significant in that it relaxes the burden of proof in
respect to the initial showing of pollution. Plaintiff must make only a
"prima facie showing that the conduct of defendant has or is likely to
pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the
public trust therein ... ."80 Defendant then has the burden of putting
forth an affirmative defense. The act also indicates that any individual
can bring an action under these provisions prior to agency action; the
court then will retain jurisdiction pending administrative procedure.81
While the act itself is important in that it is the first legislative recogni-
tion of the rights of private citizens in the public trust, the precise wrong
for which this statute intended to provide a remedy is not clear. The
act does not define what is meant by "pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion." Not only are no pollution standards contained within the act, but
one provision adds further to the confusion by raising doubts concern-
ing the applicability of agency standards in actions brought under this
act. This section provides that the court need not be bound by "stan-
dards for pollution or for an anti-pollution device or procedure, fixed by
rule or otherwise, by instrumentality or agency of the state."82  The
78. M.C.L.A. §§ 691.1201-691.1207 (1970).
79. M.C.LA. § 691.1202 (1970).
80. M.C.L.A. § 691.1203 (1970).
81. M.C.L.A. § 691.1204 (1970).
82. M.C.L.A. § 691.1202 (1970).
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court is left free to determine the "validity, applicability and reasonable-
ness of the standard" and to direct the adoption of a standard approved
by the Court.8 3 The apparent intent of this section was to avoid bind-
ing the court to apply an inadequate standard or to allow a polluter to
defend on the basis that he has complied with agency standards. Yet
the act contains no criteria by which the court is to determine the ade-
quacy of applicability of a given agency standard. While it has been
suggested that the withdrawal of the presumptions that agency stan-
dards are adequate or that a particular agency has adequately resolved
all issues is the necessary first step for the courts to effectively aid pol-
lution control, 4 there is the possibility that such a provision could prove
more harmful than beneficial. The act does not specify whether the
court must first find the agency standards inadequate before it can fix
its own or whether the court can determine the agency standard to be
unnecessarily restrictive and then order the establishment of a more
lenient standard. With this apparent discretion, it would appear that
the effectiveness of private actions under this act will depend, as do
present tort actions, on the importance of pollution control to those who
are interpreting the law.8 5 Additionally, it is questionable whether the
act could withstand a challenge on the basis that it is either too vague
or overly broad to be enforceable.8 6 As indicated above, the act con-
tains no definition of, nor standards for, pollution. Apparently every
citizen, corporation, etc., is subject to the act, but no specific types of
activities are prohibited or exempted. Additionally, compliance with
agency standards may not always be enough, but there is no indication
of when such compliance will or will not be sufficient.
A PUBLIC TRUST LAW FOR CALIFORNIA
In spite of the apparent problems of the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act, the principle underlying such legislation is indeed sound:
that the private citizen has rights under the public trust and that the
legislature should insure the enforceability of such rights by the enact-
ment of appropriate legislation. It has been the purpose of the forego-
ing analysis to demonstrate that California should also recognize the
rights of private citizens under the public trust. That the remedies
83. M.C.L.A. § 691.1202 (1970).
84. Sax, supra note 43, at 561.
85. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
86. A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.
Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 275, 287 (1961).
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available to individual citizens seeking environmental quality control
need bolstering has already been indicated. Neither would a public
trust statute incorporating air quality be all together novel as California
decisional and statutory law has already utilized such a concept to pro-
tect tide and shorelands.87
With this in mind it is proposed that California enact legislation ex-
pressly recognizing the public trust doctrine. Such a statute should in-
corporate the following ideas:
1. A definition or explanation of which resources, activities, etc.,
are encompassed in the trust and held for the benefit of all the
people.
2. A specification of what types of activities would be considered
as impairing or polluting the trust.
3. A granting of standing to any citizen as beneficiary of the trust
to bring suit to enjoin activities which are or will be in con-
travention of the public trust without the necessity of showing
individual injury or loss.
4. A shift of the burden of proof from polluted to polluter
requiring that those responsible for alleged polluting activ-
ity show by way of affirmative defense that their conduct or ac-
tivity will not impair or destroy that which belongs to the pub-
lic trust.
5. A retention of existing agency procedure and standards
where appropriate and where such can be shown to be capable
of effectively protecting the trust from abuse.
The adoption of such a statute would accomplish several goals. By
removing the existing requirements of standing and shifting the burden
of proof, it would allow the private citizen an effective remedy against
pollution. By specifying which resources are protected as belonging
within the public trust and retaining agency action where appropriate,
it would overcome the potential vagueness and apparent overbreadth of
the Michigan Environmental Protection Act.
Admittedly such a statute would not comprise a total solution
to the problem of pollution control. Not all types of problems can be
enumerated or even anticipated in a legislative enactment. Additionally,
the effectiveness of any judicial remedy provided by statute will always
in some degree depend upon the willingness of the bench to apply it.
Yet, in spite of any potential shortcomings, the adoption of a public
trust law would be an important recognition that the air, water and
87. See text accompanying notes 57-65 supra.
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natural resources belong to all the people, and, moreover, that the means
of protecting these resources should be entrusted to them.
Stephen P. Chambers
